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Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies, 
Oslo, April 1995. 
The UN at Fifty: 
A Problem of Expectations 
The conference on the United Nations' role in 
global security took place against the backdrop of 
events that highlighted all too clearly the need to 
reassess the possibilities and limitations of UN 
action in the field of international peace and 
security. As the conference met, the "Bihac crisis" 
- precipitated by the Bosnian Army's break-out 
from the Bihac enclave in late October and subse-
quent counter attacks by Bosnian and Croat Serb 
forces - continued unabated, bringing the UN 
under intense criticism from various quarters. The 
crisis over Bihac also brought into the open disa-
greements within the Alliance and among members 
of the Contact Group on Bosnia about the nature 
and modalities ofNA TO-UN cooperation. Outside 
Europe, uncertainty still surrounded UN plans to 
send a 7,OOO-strong peacekeeping force to Angola, 
while the imminent collapse of the "UN-blessed" 
regional peacekeeping efforts of the Economic 
Community of East African States (ECOW AS) in 
Liberia looked a distinct possibility. Shortly after 
the conference, it was announced that the second 
Security Council summit in the organisation's 
history, scheduled to be held in January 1995 to 
discuss the very subject of the UN's role in global 
security, had been cancelled. The reason given was 
the lack of agreement about the agenda. 
Although conference participants expressed 
different views about the best way forward, there 
was a measure of underlying agreement regarding 
the organisation's current predicament. Three 
general issues stood out. 
First, it was generally acknowledged that while 
the UN's role in international security is no longer 
at the mercy of Cold War rivalry, conflicts of 
values and interest among states persist. These 
derive in part from different historical experiences 
and account for the failure of the UN to define a 
"post-Cold War international order", the basis and 
legitimacy of which command universal assent. It 
was noted by some, for example, that the particular 
interests of developing or "non-western" countries 
have not been adequately reflected in discussions 
about the UN's role in international relations after 
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the Cold War. Specifically, many of these coun-
tries have expressed profound concern about what 
they see as an obvious tension between the new-
found activism of the UN with regard to internal 
conflicts and the cardinal principle of international 
society, namely, the sovereign equality of states 
and its corollary that there is a duty of non-inter-
vention by states in the internal affairs of other 
states. Thus, all too often, the UN was mislead-
ingly presented in the media as the public service 
institution of an "international community" which 
did not in fact exist. 
While none of this amounted to surprise revela-
tions for conference participants, it was pointed out 
that their deeper implications had been ignored in 
much of the public and professional debate about 
the UN in recent years. Specifically, in the "new 
world order" debate about the UN's potential role 
in international security following the Gulf War, 
"the inherent problems of multilateralism" had 
been neglected. With obvious reference to the 
ongoing conflict in Bosnia, it was noted that 
agreement on specific Security Council resolutions 
did not signifY agreement, let alone a determination 
to address, the underlying problems of conflict. 
Similarly, it should not necessarily be assumed that 
the ''veto free world" we have become used to will 
continue indefinitely. 
The second issue on which there was general 
agreement was closely linked to the above consid-
erations: a gap has developed between the expecta-
tions placed on the UN and what it can realistically 
hope to achieve given the paucity of political will 
and resources at its disposal. The resulting crisis of 
credibility was most evident in the "disconnect" 
that often existed between Security Council 
mandates and reality on the ground in current 
peacekeeping operations. In the specific case of the 
former Yugoslavia, the problem was evident in the 
proliferation of Security Council resolutions (now 
more than sixty) and the successive enlargements 
of the original mandate. Several of these resolu-
tions were simply non-deliverable and some were 
even at odds with one another. The problem of 
expectations has become particularly acute with 
regard to intrastate conflicts driven by religious, 
communal and historical antagonisms often 
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brought about by the break-up or collapse of state 
authority. To a greater extent than ever before in its 
fifty years history, the UN has become involved in 
sub-state conflicts, even though several participants 
agreed that these kinds of conflicts were less 
amenable to external manipulation than had been 
assumed only two or three years ago. 
The third issue on which there was broad 
agreement was that the UN was not the only, let 
alone always the preferred, instrument for prevent-
ing, containing or mitigating conflict. The UN is 
clearly not the only moral or legal force in interna-
tional affairs to which states can turn. Chapter VIII 
of the Charter allows for "regional arrangements or 
agencies" to deal with "such matters relating to the 
maintenance of peace and security as are appropri-
ate for regional action". Moreover, the inherent 
political and operational constraints on UN action 
also suggest that ad hoc "coalitions of the willing" 
might be a better alternative to UN-led actions, 
especially in cases where enforcement is being 
considered. 
The conference approached these subjects in 
three working groups. The first group explored the 
questions raised by the changing "nature of UN 
peacekeeping in recent years, focusing in particular 
on the issues of objectives, conditions and limita-
tions. The second group was concerned with the 
UN's overall ability to mount, launch and sustain 
exceedingly complex operations. In part, this 
involved a discussion of the instruments at the 
UN's disposal and the attempts to overcome or 
mitigate the problems of command and control, 
training and finance. It also required, however, a 
discussion of the problems of political control and 
possible regional alternatives to UN action. The 
third group examined the UN's role in conflict 
avoidance in the broadest sense, ranging from the 
direct contribution that could be made by the 
Secretary General, various UN bodies and special-
ised agencies, to long term confidence-building 
measures, including arms control and disarmament 
initiatives. 
Inevitably, there was much overlap between the 
groups and several key issues surfaced in different 
contexts. These included: objectives and criteria 
for UN invelvement in peacekeeping; the potential 
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and limitations of regional organisations and the 
delegation of enforcement tasks to UN-blessed 
"coalitions of the willing"; the role of the Secre-
tary-General and his immediate circle of advisers; 
and the desirability or otherwise of establishing 
some kind of UN rapid deployment capability. The 
advantages and disadvantages of activating the 
military articles of the Charter (especially the 
question of revitalising the Military Staff Commit-
tee), was also discussed in more than one group. 
I. The Changing Context of 
Peacekeeping 
The theory and practice of UN peacekeeping 
evolved as a distinctive form of third-party inter-
vention aimed, in most cases, at overseeing an 
agreed ceasefire. The deployment of lightly armed 
troops drawn from various nations was to act as a 
disincentive to the renewal of violent conflict. 
Although so-called "classical" peacekeeping 
usually involved more than simply patrolling a 
"blue line in the desert", peacekeepers still relied 
" fundamentally on the consent ofthe parties. 
Maintaining the legitimacy and credibility of an 
operation meant that the impartiality of a peace-
keeping force had to he preserved in relation to the 
disputants. 
An obvious starting point for the discussion of 
tasks and objectives was the changing context of 
peacekeeping in recent years and the difficulty, as 
several participants noted, of using the term 
"peacekeeping" to describe today's multifaceted 
and complex missions. The UN's increasing 
involvement in the mitigation of conflicts within 
states - conflicts usually driven by deep-seated 
animosities and hatreds - has meant that the 
operational environment in which forces are 
deployed has become far more fluid and violent. 
This is in contrast to most UN field operations 
before 1988 which, with the important exceptions 
of ONUC in Congo and UNIFIL in South Leba-
non, were carried out under relatively stable and 
benign conditions. In many contemporary cases of 
UN involvement, neither "front lines" nor legiti-
mate political authorities can be identified in the 




mission area. Under such circumstances, 
peacekeepers have often been forced to operate 
with only partial consent from the parties on the 
ground. It was also stressed by some participants 
that although warring factions may not be very 
sophisticated in terms of operational concepts and 
tactics, they were often in possession of advanced 
"first world" military equipment. As a result, 
peacekeeping forces now faced greater risks and 
were much more likely to sustain casualties than 
ever before (by 10 December 1994, UNPROFOR 
alone had sustained 130 fatalities). This in turn 
required that peacekeeping forces, in order to be 
effective, had to be drawn from countries capable 
of adequate force protection, logistic mobility and 
in possession of some kind of intelligence capabil-
ity. 
Against this background, it was argued that the 
very use of the term "peacekeeping" in places such 
as the former Yugoslavia only served to reinforce 
already unrealistic expectations. Just as the term 
UN Protection Force misleadingly described the 
UN's actual role in the former Yugoslavia, so the 
term "peacekeeping" was inappropriate to describe 
a situation where there was no peace to keep. It 
was suggested that a useful distinction, albeit in 
some ways still unsatisfactory, should be drawn 
between humanitarian assistance, electoral support 
and peacekeeping. In the former Yugoslavia, 
UNPROFOR's mandate in Croatia was very 
different from that in Bosnia where its principal 
task was to support the activities ofthe UNHCR, 
the "lead agency". 
There was, however, broad agreement on one 
fundamental point: although the term "peacekeep-
ing" was in some ways unsatisfactory and recent 
experience had exposed glaring deficiencies in the 
management of UN operations, this did not in itself 
suggest that the essential characteristics of tradi-
tional peacekeeping - consent, impartiality and its 
non-threatening character - were of no relevance 
for contemporary operations. Above all, it was 
widely accepted that the fundamental distinction 
between peacekeeping and enforcement had to be 
maintained and that the tendency to blur these two 
very different kinds of activity in one operation 
had to be firmly resisted. Indeed, this kind of 
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confusion had been the principal source of the 
debacle in Somalia where the excessive use of 
force in the summer and autumn of 1993 had 
drawn UNOSOM n's (and especially US) forces 
directly into combat with warring factions. The 
consequent loss of impartiality had destabilised the 
overall environment to such an extent that, in the 
end, only two policy options were left: escalation 
or withdrawal. The public mood in the US was 
such that withdrawal from Somalia, well before 
any of the stated objectives of the UN operation 
had been met, became inevitable. 
The basic objective of any peacekeeping force, 
then, must be to assist and reinforce a broader 
political process towards the effective containment 
and, ultimately, resolution of a conflict. Increas-
ingly, however, this has come to involve 
peacekeepers in a range of different activities 
including inter alia: ensuring the delivery of 
humanitarian assistance to beleaguered populations 
(in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Somalia); human 
rights monitoring in Central America and Cambo-
dia; the disarmament and demobilisation of armed 
factions as envisaged in the peace plans for An-
gola, Mozambique and Cambodia, and the preven-
tive deployment of forces as in Macedonia. As 
with traditional peacekeeping, however, these 
"wider" tasks cannot be advanced by coercive 
means. Instead, they rely on local support, sus-
tained and encouraged by the impartial character of 
UN activities. Although several participants argued 
that consent in conditions of near civil war can 
never be absolute, others stressed that it is the 
promotion of consent - by adhering to the princi-
ples of minimum force, constant liaison and 
negotiation with local parties - which continues to 
distinguish peacekeeping from enforcement, the 
objective of which is to impose a solution by 
coercive means. 
It was also emphasised by several participants, 
however, that the involvement of peacekeepers in 
humanitarian support activities (even though these 
did not envisage enforcement action) did pose 
problems of its own. Specifically, humanitarian 
operations in the midst of an. ongoing war tended to 
become politicised and manipulated by all parties, 
as events in Bosnia had amply demonstrated. 
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Several participants argued that the experience 
over the past two years, especially in the former 
Yugoslavia and in Somalia, indicated that the 
requirement of consent in UN operations should be 
reinstated more forcefully. 
Objectives and Criteria: The Basis of 
UN Involvement 
The intractability ofsome of the problems facing 
the UN and the organisational and financial strains 
placed on the organisation in recent years, gener-
ated a wide-ranging discussion about the possibil-
ity of establishing a set of criteria for UN involve-
ment. At present, the UN was patently over-
extended and its credibility was suffering as a 
result. For it to be restored, it was observed, it was 
not only the number of operations that had to be 
scaled down; the justifications and purposes of 
peacekeeping had to be limited. It was also widely 
felt that the mandate given to a peacekeeping force 
should not merely reflect the political aspirations 
and moral indignation of member states; it also had 
to be capable of translation into effective action on 
the ground." 
In view of this, it was suggested that the UN 
should p~rhaps "learn to say no" and that it should 
do so against a "checklist" of criteria. Similarly, 
the UN should be prepared to terminate an opera-
tion or scale down a mission if it was clearly not 
advancing the objectives set for it at the outset. 
Many participants, however, warned against the 
temptation to enumerate criteria and conditions in 
advance. Two obvious pifficulties were stressed. 
First, although a set of criteria might perhaps be 
desirable in the abstract, when applied to a range of 
different circumstances, they tended either to be 
too narrow or far too loose. Second, although the 
UN was over-extended, saying "flat no" was much 
more difficult in reality than was commonly 
assumed. In part, this was because the political 
imperative for the Security Council to act was still 
considerable, even though the outcome of an 
operation (or the viability of a particular ceasefire 
agreement) was often difficult to ascertain in 
advance. Furthermore, the UN could not be seen to 
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differentiate between requests from member states. 
Much of the discussion about the problems of 
elaborating and applying criteria for participation 
in UN operations, took as its point of reference 
current US policy on peacekeeping. This policy 
has been formally codified in Presidential Decision 
Directive 25 (POD 25). POD 25, itself the outcome 
of a lengthy process of discussion and inter-agency 
review, sets forth a series of conditions for US 
support of and participation in UN field operations. 
Two of these were found by several participants to 
be particularly problematic: 
• the objectives of a peacekeeping operation have 
to be in "America's own national interest" and 
assured of "continuing public and Congress-
ional support", 
• the commitment of US troops cannot be "open-
ended" and consequently an "exit strategy" 
must be in place before troops are deployed. 
A brief survey of contemporary intrastate conflicts 
illustrates the inherent difficulties of applying these 
criteria. A narrow definition of "national interest" 
and the insistence on "no open-ended commit-
ments" appear to rule out most of the cases which 
the UN and regional organisations have been called 
upon to address in recent years (and are likely to be 
called upon to address in the future). In addition to 
"national interests", which would always remain 
the responsibility of individual governments to 
define and pursue, a notion of "collective" or 
"international" interests had to be embraced. 
Several participants noted that the outcome of 
recent Congressional elections and the general 
mood of introspection ensured that the requirement 
of "continuing public support" was also bound to 
limit the scope for future US involvement. Indeed, 
it was observed with some irony that the deploy-
ment of US troops in a preventive mode in Mac-
edonia would not have taken place if the criteria 
now enshrined in POD 25 had been applied at the 
time. 
Similarly, to announce an "exit date" in ad-
vance was simply to invite those elements who 
wished to frustrate an operation and resume 
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fighting to "lie low" until a peacekeeping force had 
left (an "exit date", it should be added, is not 
necessarily entailed by an "exit strategy"). 
11. Instruments and Organisation for 
Peacekeeping 
In 1987 some 10,000 military personnel were 
involved in 5 UN operations. By early 1994, the 
UN was running 17 operations and deploying 
about 72,000 military and police personneL This 
dramatic increase in the number and, equally 
importantly, the multifaceted character of UN field 
operations, have placed a considerable strain on the 
ability of the organisation effectively to launch and 
sustain operations. Added to this, many of the self-
imposed limitations that have historically charac-
terised UN operations - including the lack of 
proper planning, inefficient financial and procure-
ment regulations, and restrictions on the collection 
and use of intelligence - have further compounded 
the problems of peacekeeping management. 
In spite of these challenges, several participants 
stressed that significant improvements had been 
made within the Secretariat, especially over the 
past two years, and that these should be both 
acknowledged and welcomed as steps in the right 
direction. In particular, the Department of Peace-
keeping Operations (DPKO), formally responsible 
for the "day-to-day executive direction of all 
peacekeeping operations", has been significantly 
upgraded. Some of the specific steps taken to 
strengthen the DPKO include: a considerable 
expansion of staffing levels; the creation of a 
Planning Division under a new Office of Planning 
and Support; and the establishment of the Situation 
Centre. The Situation Centre, originally set up to 
support activities in Somalia, has since been 
upgraded and now operates round the clock in 
accordance with proper staff procedures. It acts as 
a communication channel between the headquar-
ters in New York and missions in the field, while 
also providing a mechanism whereby information 
is disseminated within the Secretariat and to troop 
contributing countries. In order to improve the UN 
headquarters' capability to monitor and support 
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missions, measures have also been taken to in-
crease the flow of information to the UN from 
member states (for this purpose the US has donated 
an information/intelligence processing system in 
the DPKO). Although the UN's capacities for 
collection and dissemination of information require 
further development, the creation of the Situation 
Centre (with an embryonic research and analysis 
capability) does represent a major step forward 
(not least psychologically for the UN). A more 
flexible attitude within the UN to the issues of 
"intelligence" is also discernible. 
But perhaps most encouragingly, the UN has 
strengthened its pre-deployment planning capacity 
and has finally incorporated the Field Operations 
Division (formerly located within the Department 
of Administration and Management) into the 
Office of Planning and Support (DPKO). In theory, 
this should allow for integrated planning, espe-
cially important in the area of logistics. Indeed, the 
new peacekeeping mission for Angola (UNA VEM 
I1I), if it goes ahead, will be the first operation that 
will have been properly planned by a military-
civilian staff in New York before the Security 
Council takes the final decision on deployment. 
Another commendable development has been 
the creation of a Stand-By Planning Group which 
over the past 2 years has worked hard to define 
military requirements for future operations and to 
elicit commitments from member states for units 
which, in principle, could be called upon at short 
notice to participate in UN operations. 
Although the process of vertical integration 
within the DPKO has been successful, it was 
pointed out by some participants that horizontal 
integration across departmental boundaries was 
less than satisfactory. In part this stemmed from the 
somewhat artificial delineation of bureaucratic 
functions and responsibilities between departments 
within the Secretariat. It is, for example, impossi-
ble in practice to insist that the. DPKO should only 
be responsible for the "operational" side of a 
peacekeeping mission, while the Department of 
Political Affairs (DPA) should deal only with the 
"political" side, and the Department of Hum ani tar-
ian Affairs (DHA) only with "humanitarian" 




encompass overlapping political, operational and 
humanitarian aspects. A further complicating 
factor, however, has been the role of the Secretary 
General who, it was felt by some, had not done 
enough to integrate the various departments, 
offices and division engaged in field operations. 
Instead, the Secretary General has strengthened his 
own Executive Office at the" expense, according to 
some participants, of integration and closer coordi-
nation among substantive departments (see below). 
In spite of this, participants felt that the 
achievements of the Secretariat needed greater 
recognition and that the problems that continued to 
exist might eventually be overcome. 
Although the attempts to strengthen the ability 
of the UN headquarters in New York to engage in 
mission support, force generation and planning was 
broadly welcomed, some participants stressed that 
New York should not seek to become an opera-
tional headquarters in the strict military sense. On 
the contrary, it was felt that the exercise of com-
mand functions should be clearly delegated to the 
Special Representative and Force Commander in 
the field. Although there could be no question of 
undermining strategic direction and political 
control from the Security Council in New York, 
greater financial, administrative and operational 
authority to the field would enhance military 
effectiveness. 
The discussion of the problems that continue to 
bedevil UN forces in the field - including issues of 
logistics planning and support; command, control, 
coordination and intelligence (C3J); tactical 
mobility and procurement - also pointed to the 
need for improving "mission support" from New 
York while vesting "mission command" firmly 
with commander in the field. Finally, the vital 
importance of proper training with an emphasis on 
the multinational and multicultural nature of UN 
operations, was emphasised. 
Revitalising the lI\IIlilitary Staff 
Committee? 
In more than one context, the potential role of the 
now moribund Military Staff Committee (MSC) 
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was discussed. Article 47 of the Charter describes 
the MSC, consisting of the "Chiefs of Staff ofthe 
permanent members of the Security Council or 
their representatives", as a body that will "advise 
and assist the Security Council on all questions 
relating to the Security Council's military require-
ments for the maintenance of international peace 
and security". The MSC was never activated in the 
manner originally envisaged, though it has fre-
quently surfaced in discussions about strengthening 
the UN's capacity to undertake and direct military 
operations. Indeed, both France and the Soviet 
Union under Mikhail Gorbachev put forward 
proposals in the General Assembly calling for its 
reactivation. 
Among those participants advocating the need 
for some kind of rapid response capability to be 
developed (see below), the MSC was viewed as a 
natural body that could be charged with overseeing 
its activities. Others pointed out that although the 
MSC should not be resurrected for the operational 
purpose of providing "strategic direction for forces 
put at the disposal ofthe Security Council" (Article 
47) , it might nonetheless be useful as a body that 
can provide much-needed military advice for the 
Secretariat and the Secretary General. It was 
suggested, for example, that if high-level expert 
advise had been available at the time, the inherent 
military difficulties and long-term consequences of 
the "safe areas" deployment in Bosnia in 1993 
might have been pointed out. 
The idea of revitalising the MSC, however, also 
poses several problems. One of these is that its 
reactivation would appear to strengthen the influ-
ence of the permanent members of the Security 
Council at a time when the very structure and 
legitimacy of the Council is coming under increas-
ing scrutiny. Many non-Western members would 
undoubtedly see the reactivation of the MSC as an 
attempt to perpetuate and indeed reinforce existing 
inequities in the UN system. Moreover, there was 
always the danger that the divisions and political 
differences that existed on the Security Council 
would resurface in a revitalised MSC. As was 
pointed out, there was no shortage of "expert" 
military advice over the issue of establishing "safe 
areas" in Bosnia. In fact, the Secretariat did obtain 
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a detailed assessment from the Force Commander 
in the field. Thus, the decision to pass Resolution 
836 clearly reflected considerations other than 
purely military ones. 
Finally, it was also felt by some that although 
military expertise for the UN was needed, this 
should be concentrated in the DPKO; activating the 
MSC would only add a parallel and competing 
bureaucracy. 
The UN's Financial Predicament 
The UN's financial difficulties have long been a 
subject of concern. The present state of affairs is , 
however, particularly serious as the financial 
situation is impacting ever more directly on opera-
tional activities. At the same time, arrears continue 
to accumulate whilst the remedial measures 
proposed by member states and advisory bodies 
have either not been acted upon or have failed to 
produce the desired results. For example, the 
Peacekeeping Reserve Fund of $150 million 
created in December 1992 has already been 
depleted while no satisfactory mechanism for 
reimbursing troop-contributing countries has been 
agreed. 
It was observed that the most immediate 
problem of financing peacekeeping operations 
stems from the nature of the UN budgetary process 
itself. Specifically, as long as the Advisory Com-
mittee on Adminis~rative and Budgetary Questions 
of the General Assembly (ACABQ) reviews the 
initial budget for a mission, expenditure may not 
exceed a $3 million annual limit on the Secretary 
General's "unforeseen and extraordinary" spending 
authority. Once the budget has been approved by 
the ACABQ, services and equipment can be 
contracted for up to $10 million until the Fifth 
Committee (Budget) of the General Assembly 
approves the budget. Combined with an exceed-
ingly complex procurement system, this slow and 
cumbersome process has helped generate major 
delays in the deployment of UN personnel. Several 
participants noted that an important aspect of the 
problem of financial support has been the failure of 
the UN to delegate sufficient financial and admin-
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istrative authority from New York to the field 
mission. 
Although, it was generally acknowledged that 
these problems needed to be addressed, some 
participants expressed uneasiness about the ability 
of the UN to "put its own house in order", citing 
instances of corruption and of financial misman-
agement. It was also argued that certain countries, 
notably the US, were paying an inordinate share of 
the overall peacekeeping budget (ca. 31 %), while 
other countries certainly had the means to pay 
more and should be encouraged to do so. Saudi 
Arabia (which pays 0.192% on the 1992 peace-
keeping assessment scale) was cited as a case in 
point. A more equitable distribution of payment 
was also seen as a necessary prerequisite for the 
US administration to be able to rebuild Congres-
sional support for other initiatives aimed at 
strengthening the organisation. 
Ill. Conflict Avoidance and Preventive 
Measures 
The need to respond early and flexibly to signs of 
potential conflict, preferably before a crisis erupts 
into violence, is an uncontroversial proposition, 
and several participants emphasised the need for 
the UN to become much more "pro-active" in the 
field of peace and security. The preventive deploy-
ment of UN peacekeepers in Macedonia was one 
initiative whose potential value in other circum-
stances should be explored further. Other initia-
tives that had in the past come to nought - notably 
the creation in 1988 ofthe Office of Research and 
Collection of Information (ORCI) in order to 
provide warning and analysis of emerging crisis for 
the Secretary General - ought perhaps to be revis-
ited. Indeed, the importance of improving the early 
warning capacities of the UN was brought up 
repeatedly in different contexts. In particular, there 
was a need to ensure that the information gathered 
and stored by Specialised Agencies and NGOs was 
filtered through to the Secretary-General in an 
effective manner, while at the same time, the 






As was noted during the conference, however, 
"preventive action" was also one of those fre-
quently used concepts which turned out to be more 
problematic in practice than in the abstract. Three 
points were stressed. 
First, the lack of adequate warning is in fact 
rarely a problem. As one participant observed, the 
war in the former Yugoslavia was perhaps one of 
the most widely predicted conflicts at the end of 
the twentieth century. Similarly, there is no short-
age of indicators suggesting that "early" attention 
should now be given to, say, Burundi, Zaire and 
Sudan. The central problem, it would seem, is that 
awareness of a potential crisis does not automati-
cally translate into agreement as to how it should 
be addressed. All too often, the interests of states 
differ with respect to a conflict, making concerted 
action and a consistent policy difficult to pursue. 
More generally, it was also observed that "early 
warning" or good intelligence does not in itself 
necessarily mean better decisions. 
Second, it has proved difficult for many gov-
ernments - particularly in democracies where re-
election is fought on the strength of what has been 
achieved in office - to commit resources and stake 
political capital on something which might or 
might not happen. The above discussion of the 
"action" criteria enshrined in PDD 25 highlighted 
this particular problem. 
Third, the particular form which a "preventive 
measure" assumes must be carefully considered as 
its consequences are often difficult calculate. For 
example, a preventive deploymentofUN troops 
along one side of a disputed border must take 
account ofthe effect this might have on the per-
ceived impartiality of a UN force. Indeed, under 
certain circumstances, such a deployment may give 
the impression that the UN is taking sides in a 
conflict and thus destabiIise a peacekeeping 
environment rather than increase overall confi-
dence. Similarly, the appointment of special 
representatives or envoys to lead or take part in 
preventive diplomacy missions must take full 
account of the particular background and experi-
ence which an appointee brings to his post (in 
making this point, several participants implicitly 
criticised some of the choices made by the Secre-
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tary General in recent years). 
More generally, it was stressed that a truly 
meaningful discussion of "conflict avoidance" had 
to be more broadly focused and take a long term 
view. In this context) preventive "measures" was 
preferable to the term "preventive diplomacy" as 
the latter appeared to exclude socia-economic and 
structural sources of conflict. Confidence-building 
measures and initiatives such as the UN Conven-
tional Arms Register focused on long term prob-
lems, and these had to be addressed. 
The Role of Secretary General and the 
Security Council 
Under Article 99 of the Charter, the Secretary 
General "may bring to the attention of the Security 
Council any matter which in his opinion may 
threaten the maintenance of international peace and 
security". It was generally agreed that the Secre-
tary General had a potentially unique role to play 
in the field of conflict avoidance and that his 
support machinery for conflict prevention should 
be strengthened. It was argued, however, that the 
authority and "good offices" of the Secretary 
General tended to more effective before an issue 
reached the level of the Security Council. Partly for 
this reason, the Secretary General should be 
encouraged and indeed empowered to be more 
active at the lower end ofthe spectrum of conflict. 
Although the Secretary General must continue to 
inform and, when necessary, consult with the 
Security Council, the council itself should be kept 
"in reserve" until its involvement is warranted by 
the gravity of a situation. 
An important reason for this is that the Security 
Council is a blunt instrument and issues tend to 
become polarised before it, something which in 
turn limits the room for manoeuvre and narrows 
the range of policy options. It was also stressed 
that while the capacity to engage in "quiet diplo-
macy" ought to be enhanced, the impartiality of the 
Secretary General's position had to be carefully 
guarded. 
An important step in the direction of strength-
ening the role of the Secretary General in the area 
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of conflict avoidance would be for him to make 
wider use of panels of experts. These should be 
drawn, if necessary, from outside the organisation. 
Similarly, greater use could also be made of 
"eminent persons" and special envoys. In this 
context, however, it was observed that the Secre-
tariat had not taken up a recent French-British offer 
in which lists of experts who could be used on 
preventative diplomacy missions had been pro-
vided to the Secretary General. 
An additional and equally important step is to 
coordinate properly the activities of existing bodies 
inside and outside the UN system that can contrib-
ute towards conflict avoidance. In particular, it was 
observed that the relationship between the Secre-
tary-General and the Specialised Agencies needs to 
be reviewed so as to ensure that information was 
fed into the Secretary General's office on a regular-
ised basis. A problem here, it was acknowledged, 
was that specialised agencies are answerable to 
their governing bodies and that no formal channel 
or mechanism for coordination with the Secretary-
General actually exists. While "grand coordination 
meetings" provide no solution to the problems of 
coordination, the Secretary-General ought perhaps 
to be allowed to act more as a primus inter pares in 
relation to the agencies. 
In discussing the role of the Secretary General, 
much emphasis was placed on the need for flexibil-
ity. Several participants noted that in the recent 
past such flexibility had been admirably facilitated 
by the use of so-called "friends groups" (consisting 
a representatives of various member states). In the 
cases of Cambodia, El Salvador and Haiti, these 
had turned out to be well suited for carrying out 
various conflict mediation tasks. The creation of 
groups of concerned and "friendly" states should, 
where appropriate, be encouraged further by the 
Secretary General who should seek to make them 
as inclusive as possible. 
It proved difficult throughout the conference, as 
indeed is the case in "real" life, to separate the 
discussion of the role of the Secretary-General 
from the issue ofthe personality and management 
style of the office holder. This was equally true 
with regard to the appointment of various Special 
Representatives of the Secretary General. On some 
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occasions in the past, these appointments had 
turned out to be unfortunate. With regard to the 
current Secretary General some unease was ex-
pressed about the tendency to strengthen the role of 
his immediate circle of advisors in the Executive 
Office of the Secretary-General (EOSG) at the 
expense, it was argued, of efforts to integrate the 
activities of key departments. Over the past year, 
both geographical and functional responsibilities 
have been accorded to three senior officials in the 
EOSG. This has resulted in a "top-heavy" structure 
in New York, and has effectively created, if not a 
layer between the Secretary-General and the 
substantive departments of the Secretariat, then at 
least greater distance between them. 
The very centrality of the Secretary-General to 
the work of the organisation led several partici-
pants to suggest that the process whereby he is 
chosen (described by some as downright "farci-
cal") should be reviewed. 
The Contribution of Regional 
Organisations 
In August 1994 the UN Secretary General held the 
first formal meeting in New York with representa-
tives of 10 regional organisations and bodies in 
order to explore how closer cooperation could be 
effected in the future. The obvious strains which 
the expansion of peacekeeping operations have 
placed on the capacities of the UN, as well as the 
pressure for additional commitments in other parts 
of the world (most notably in Africa) do indeed 
suggest that delegating peacekeeping and conflict 
avoidance tasks more broadly to regional bodies 
merits further consideration. It was pointed out that 
these need not be organisations in the strict techni-
cal sense, but may (as the Charter itself allows for) 
be "arrangements" or looser groupings of member 
states. It was also felt by some participants that 
regional groupings and initiatives may be most 
effective at the lower or lighter end of the spectrum 
of conflict, engaged in various monitoring, media-
tion and "good offices" functions. The activities of 
the CSCE High Commissioner for National Mi-
norities and the various Rapporteur and Fact-
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Finding Missions established by the CSCE in 
recent years, were held out as positive examples. 
Nonetheless, important limitations on the 
contribution which regional organisations can 
make, specifically to UN peacekeeping, remain. In 
the first place, most regional organisations (with 
the obvious exception of NATO) are weaker both 
institutionally and financially than the UN. The 
Organisation of African Unity, for example, is 
severely constrained financially (as indeed turned 
out to be the case when it sent a peacekeeping 
force to Chad in the early 1980s). But perhaps the 
most serious problem with regionally-based 
initiatives, is the fact that proximity to a conflict -
paradoxically, the supposed strength of regional 
organisations - is also frequently their principal 
liability. This is because regional organisations, 
especially if they include among their members a 
regional hegemon, tend to intetject local or re-
gional politics into the area where they are de-
ployed. One of the clearest examples of this in 
recent years has been the ECOWAS force in 
Liberia which, although blessed by the UN, is 
widely perceived by warring factions and neigh-
bouring states as an instrument of Nigerian foreign 
policy. The experience of Russian-led CIS "peace-
keeping" in parts of the former Soviet Union, 
highlights the problem of impartiality and legiti-
macy even more starkly. 
The reference to Russian "peacekeeping" 
practice generated an interesting discussion about 
what several participants saw as a process of de 
facto regionalisation taking place into different 
"peacekeeping spheres of influence". American 
action in Haiti, Russian-style peacekeeping in the 
near-abroad and French policy in parts of Africa, 
all appeared to suggest a pattern of unilateral action 
whose tacit formalisation might result in a "modi-
fied notion of spheres of influence". The political, 
financial and operational pressures pushing this 
development were recognised, but considerable 
concern was expressed about its broader ramifica-
tions. Not only could it be used to legitimise 
dubious policies and activities on the part of major 
powers, it would also exclude certain parts of the 
world from consideration. 
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"Coalitions of the Willing" 
The weaknesses of most regional organisations and 
the difficulties encountered by the UN in mounting 
and sustaining military operations, led many 
participants to argue that the use of ad hoc coali-
tions should be explored more systematically. 
Indeed, when the challenge was one of large-scale 
enforcement, participants broadly agreed that the 
UN should authorise the use of force to a "coalition 
of the willing" (as it did to US-led coalitions in 
Korea in 1950, the Gulf in 1990, and Operation 
Restore Hope in Somalia in 1992). The delegation 
of enforcement tasks was both inevitable and 
desirable. It was desirable in the sense that the 
commitment of coalition partners to "stay the 
course" would presumably not be subject to the 
vagrancies of "soft" political will. Moreover, such 
coalitions were unlikely to suffer from the problem 
of limited resources and inadequate capabilities 
(especially as the US was likely to be involved). 
Nor would it suffer from the kind of command and 
control problems endemic to all UN-led operations. 
Indeed, as was pointed out, the ability of the 
Secretariat to provide executive direction for large-
scale operations continues to be severely limited. 
Nonetheless, UN-blessed "coalitions of the 
willing" also presented certain problems. Perhaps 
the most significant of these was that oflegitimacy 
and political control. If the activities of a coalition 
were indeed in support of UN resolutions, the 
question of its wider legitimacy needed to be 
addressed. Some participants argued that one role 
for a revitalised MSC might be to ensure that a 
measure of political control was exercised by the 
UN over operations. In response to this, however, 
others argued strongly that if major military 
operations were being conducted, there could be no 
question of UN "oversighf'. Interference in the 
planning and conduct of operations would simply 
not be allowed. 
It was generally acknowledged that there was 
always likely to be some tension between the 
requirements oflegitimacy and efficiency, and it 
was noted that the tension between these two 
requirements was also at the heart of the broader 
issue of Security Council reform. In this connec-
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tion it was argued that if agreement (on the issue of 
refonn and the question of when Security Council 
action should be taken) could not be reached on the 
basis of substantive criteria, it became all the more 
important to reach some agreement on procedural 
criteria. 
A further problem that was identified concerned 
the "handing over" of an operation from a coalition 
or a state to a UN force. The transition from the 
US-led UNITAF operation (Restore Hope) to 
UNOSOM 11 in Somalia in 1993 illustrated the 
problem. Not only was this process far from 
smooth; it was never properly completed as the US 
effectively "hijacked" the operation in the summer 
of 1993 once the casualty rate among UN troops 
began to rise. As a result, the UN exercised little 
command and hardly any control over the actions 
of various contingents in Somalia. 
A UN Rapid Deployment Force? 
Although participants clearly differed in their 
views as to the general desirability of establishing a 
standing UN force, the discussion was not as 
divisive nor were opinions as divided as might 
perhaps have been expected. An important reason 
for this was that no one was arguing for the crea-
tion of a separately constituted force capable of 
large-scale enforcement action under Chapter VII 
of the Charter. Instead, what was put forward was 
the idea of a much more modest "humanitarian 
police force" consisting of a cadre of highly 
trained, immediately available, civilian and police 
officials that could be deployed on short notice to 
fonn the nucleus of a larger force. In addition to 
this, such a force might be trained and equipped to 
carry out limited tasks including the protection of 
relief supplies and the maintenance of order in 
refugee camps. The key rationale for establishing 
such a force would be to provide a rapid response 
capability to stabilise a tense or deteriorating 
situation. Above all, it would help to reduce the 
substantial delays in the deployment offorces that 
have plagued all recent peacekeeping operations. 
In the fonner Yugoslavia, the first units arrived in 
March 1992 though it was not until July-August 
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that the entire force of military and civilian staff 
had been deployed, by which time the situation on 
the ground had changed dramatically. Similarly, in 
Cambodia it took nearly eight months for UNT AC 
to complete its deployment. 
It was noted by some participants that the 
Stand-By Force initiative, to which more than 30 
countries have now fonnally committed them-
selves, already offered a means of reducing the lag 
in deployment time. As was pointed out, however, 
when the Secretariat activated the Stand-By system 
earlier this year in response to the situation in 
Rwanda, not a single member state approached 
was prepared to offer troops for an operation. In 
this particular case, the Stand-By system worked as 
a mechanism for rapid negative responses, not 
force generation. 
Nonetheless, it was pointed out that a distinc-
tion should perhaps be drawn between issue of 
"rapid deployment" and a "rapid deployment 
force". One could, for example, ensure a rapid 
response by putting in specialist units (eg. logistics, 
communications, engineering and a rudimentary 
HQ element) drawn from a few countries, if these 
were given a guarantee that they would be able to 
take their troops out again quickly. The recruitment 
and financing of a Rapid Deployment Force were 
also seen by many to be problematic, as was the 
issue of deciding between competing claims for its 
deployment. Nonetheless, there was broad agree-
ment that the need to respond early was vital and 
that the current lag in deployment was unaccept-
able. 
Conclusions 
Although the conference overall struck a caution-
ary note - stressing the need to bring expectations 
in line with reality, while recognising that some of 
the problems facing the organisation simply cannot 
be solved with the existing resources and the 
tenuous nature ofthe political commitment demon-
strated by key member states - it was argued that 
one ought not to be too gloomy. A historical 
perspective had to be introduced and if the expec-
tations of 199 I -92 had been too optimistic, the 
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current pessimism conveyed by tbe media was 
perhaps excessive. Moreover, for all its problems, 
the UN had some notable achievements to its 
credit: its involvement in tbe transition process 
from Soutb African rule to independence in 
Namibia, its contribution to tbe peace process in 
Central America, tbe successful holding of elec-
tions in Cambodia and Mozambique. Even in terms 
of improving its own management structures and 
institutional capacities for peacekeeping, consider-
able progress has been made over tbe past two 
years. Moreover, many participants echoed Conor 
Cruise O'Brien's view tbat tbe UN had always 
been tbere to perform an unstated task: taking tbe 
blame for the mistakes of governments and acting 
as a "scapegoat" when tbis was required. Whetber 
or not this is a healtby role for tbe organisation in 
tbe long run, tbere was general agreement tbat tbe 
difficulties over tbe past tbree years could not be 
attributed solely to tbe failure of tbe UN as an 
institution to adapt to rapidly changing circum-
stances. Altbough tbe pace and progress of UN 
reform did leave considerable room for improve-
ment, tbe personalities involved and tbe competing 
interests and values of states would always impact 
upon tbe effectiveness of tbe organisation, espe-
cially in tbe realm of international peace and 
security. Partly for tbese reasons, several partici-
pants expressed scepticism about viewing tbe UN 
as an agent for change. Perhaps a more modest but 
no less honourable approach would be to concen-
trate and build on tbe proven assets of tbe organisa-
tion and utilise tbese as a means of managing 
change by peaceful processes. 
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